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COMMENTS
He marked on the left side of the sheet the autos going south. Those on the
right side indicated autos passing his window in the opposite direction. The
Justice of the Peace announced to the young barristers with some pride that
on a busy Decoration Day he had counted 1200 cars.
The moral of the cobbler-Justice of the Peace is sufficiently clear and re-
quires no labored development. Cobbler shops and red flannel shirts are
typically American but we would hardly argue for the extension of this form
of administering justice" in complicated cases. As a matter of fact the juris-
diction of the non-lawyer justice is disappearing for reasons many and diverse.
Contrariwise the presence of a robed justice in a well appointed courtroom
does not itself insure the corredt decision or true administration of justice.
Thus far we go along with the argument of Judge Frank. Even so, a black
robe rather than a red shirt, has its advantages in symbolizing the dignity
and the majesty of the law and the conscience of the state speaking through
its judiciary.
The learned Judge has not demonstrated that the abolition of the judicial
robe would better the judicial process in any substantial degree. On the other
hand, there is warrant for the belief that American traditions and the con-
tinuity of our institutions are inspired and perpetuated by representative sym-
bols. Our flag, which Thorstein Veblen once summed up as a piece of woolen
bunting, has assumed a new and glorious texture during the war years. The
uniforms of our Armed Forces also spell out untold sacrifice and suffering in
our behalf. Symbolism has been partially in eclipse, it is true, in recent years.
As late as 193-7, Thurman Arnold in his Folklore of Capitalism dismissed the
symbol of "cruel German" as a mere bogey man invented to frighten American
adults.'3
Lacking good reasons for its removal and finding adequate reasons for its
long tradition in the law, we enter this wholly inadequate plea for the continu-
ance of the Cult of the Robe.
STATUTORY REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF
WORLD WAR II VETERANS
I
The accelerated demobilization of American military forces since the cessa-
tion of actual fighting has inevitably aroused public interest in the legislative
provisions which have been enacted to facilitate the serviceman's adjustment
in a post-war economy. A minimum of misunderstanding has been manifested
in the interpretation of some of the veteran's legislation, such as the so-called
G.I. Bill of Rights.' But where the interests of third parties are adversely
affected, directly or indirectly, by the provisions enacted for the protection
13. ARNOLD, TiE FOLKLoRE or CAPiTALism (1937) 30.
1. 58 STAT. 284 (1944), 38 U. S. C. A. § 693 (1944).
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of the veteran, the application of the law has often resulted in misunderstanding
fed by uncertainty and conflicting opinion. Such misunderstanding has threat-
ened to undermine the effectiveness of the reemployment provisions of Section 8
of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.2
Section 8 is brief and fairly compact. A reading of its provisions immedi-
ately manifests its purpose to guarantee to the qualified veteran the job which
he left to enter the armed forces-not just a job, but the same job or one
substantially its equivalent. Section 8 fills the void which veterans of World
War I encountered upon their discharge from service. The criticism which has
been leveled recently at Section 8 suggests that its supposed deficiency lies not
so much in a failure to provide adequately for the veteran as in the absence
of provisions protecting third parties from a disturbance by the returning
veterans of the status quo.
With the present dearth of judicial interpretation, wherein must lie the
final arbitration of the conflicting interests now besetting Section 8, an un-
inhibited variety of dicta has been released by administrative agencies, labor
unions, veterans' organizations, and others, until today the responsible employer
is confronted with indecision and uncertainty in seeking to comply with the
law. Perhaps the most authoritative non-judicial voice which has been raised
in this connection is that of the Director of Selective Service. 3 The official
pronouncements of the Director of Selective Service in reference to the re-
employment provisions of the Act are to be found in local board memoranda
and policy guides. Generally, administrative regulations authorized by statute
have the force of law where they are issued within the scope of that law and
are reasonable and consistent therewith. 4 While the Director has from time
to time issued appropriate regulations dealing with the classification and in-
duction of registrants, his statements concerning his agency's policy in re-
employment have been generally confined to local board "memoranda" and
2. 54 STAT. 885 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 308 (1940).
3. By § 10 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as amended, the
President is authorized to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of the Act; by § 10 (b) he is authorized to delegate "to the Director of Selective
Service only" any authority vested in him under the Act that vested in him by excepting
§ 9 which contains the so-called "draft of industry" provisions. In addition § 8 (g) of
the Act provides that the Director of Selective Service "shall establish a Personnel Division
with adequate facilities to render aid in the replacement in their former positions of, or
in securing positions for, members of the reserve components of the land and naval forces
of the United States who have satisfactorily completed any period of active duty, and
persons who have satisfactorily completed any period of their training and service under
the Act."
4. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462
(1910); International Railway Co. v. Davidson, 25 U. S. 506, 514 (1922). An adminis-
trative agency, however, obviously cannot issue such regulations as have the effect of
altering or extending a statute or modifying its provisions. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S.
466 (1882) ; Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S. 599, 610 (1930); Miller v.
United States, 294 U. S. 435 (1935).
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bulletins for the guidance of local Selective Service agents. The reason for
this would appear to lie in the fact that the Act does not specifically give the
Director the responsibility of carrying out the reemployment provisions of the
Act by issuance to private employers of orders directing compliance. Rather,
the enforcement of the rights provided for is specifically turned over to the
courts, and in such enforcement proceedings the veteran is entitled to be
represented by the proper United States Attorney and not by the Director
of Selective Service. The Director himself has admitted that he is without
authority to issue binding interpretations of Section 8 and that only the federal
courts are specifically clothed with authority to interpret and enforce its
provisions.5 While recognizing the exclusive function of Congress to legislate
on the subject of national military training and all rights and obligatons in
connection therewith,6 and the exclusive power of the courts to interpret such
legislation, 7 the Director of Selective Service has embodied his agency's views
on Section 8 in several releases and memoranda which have played an impor-
tant role in the development of this provision. While the interpretations of
Selective Service do not bear the force of law, they cannot be disregarded in
any 'discussion of the statutory provisions affected. Selective Service has fre-
quently asserted its duty, in conjunction with administering the Act, to inter-
pret its application until the courts pass upon any particular issue.8 At least
one District Court has recognized the value of the interpretations of Selective
Service in arriving at a decision. In the recent case of Tipper v. Northern
Pacific Ry.9 the court stated in part:
"In construing the Act as it now exists and applies to this particular case, this
court does give great weight and consideration to the regulations of the Director
of Selective Service. While not being able to look to them as a precedent, never-
5. - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 16 LAt. REL. REP. 213. In his most recent
summation of Selective Service Policy toward the reemployment provisions of § 8, the
Director of Selective Service was careful to refer to his statements as, "determinations
and interpretations." Handbook-Veterans Assistance Program, National Headquarters,
Selective Service System, (1945) § 301.1 (b).
6. "It is well to keep in mind that the statutory reemployment rights of veterans are
established by the Congress in the exercise of its war powers and its power to raise armies
and support navies and are not estabilshed by the executive branch of the Government
or by industry, agriculture, or labor. Selective Service Publication of April, 1945, 1 Prentice-
Hall Labor Service 2194; Release S-64, National Headquarters, Selective Service System,
May 9, 1945.
7. Ibid. See also Local Board Memorandum No. 190-A, National Headquarters, Selec-
tive Service System, as issued May 20, 1944.
S. "National Headquarters of the Selective Service System prepares the general plans
and makes all decisions in interpreting the application of the Act. This is necessary in
order to secure uniformity of interpretation, since many organizations affected are interstate
and a lack of uniformity in the Act would make it unworkable." Selective Service Re-
employment Bulletin No. 1, issued September 29, 1943. See also Selective Service Publi-
cation of April, 1945, 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Service 2194; Release S-64, National Head-
quarters, Selective Service System, May 9, 1945.
9. - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB. REL. REP. 147.
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theless, if it can be read into them or out of them just exactly what the intent was
when issued, why certainly that intent should be given expression. .. ."
Another District Court has followed reasoning similar to that announced
by Selective Service in the face of strong opposition in a case in which that
agency had taken more than a passive interest.'0 For these reasons the view-
points announced by the Director of Selective Service in connection with
Section 8, while lacking in the binding force of judicial interpretations, are of
sufficient significance to give them careful attention in this analysis."
II
"Sec. 8 (a). Any person inducted into the land or naval forces under
this Act for training and service, who, in the judgment of those in author-
ity over him, satisfactorily completes his period of training and service
uider section 3 (b) shall be entitled to a certificate to that effect upon
the completion of such period of training and service, whick shall include
a record of any special proficiency or merit attained."
Who is eligible for the benefits stipulated in Section 8? The original lan-
guage of Section 8 (a) confining the benefits to "any person inducted" into
the armed forces has been broadened to include "any person who, subsequent
to May 1, 1940 . . . shall have entered upon active military or naval service
in the land or naval forces of the United States."' 2 This provision is sufficiently
broad to cover volunteers as well as inductees, officers and enlisted men, and
servicewomen. Right to reemployment in their former positions has also been
extended to members of the Merchant Marine.' 3 Persons to whom Selective
Service has declared the benefits of Section 8 to be inapplicable include mem-
bers of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, conscientious objectors, and persons in the
employ of any state or political subdivision thereof. 4
In order to be eligible for restoration to his former position, the veteran
must produce a certificate showing that, in the judgment of those in authority
over him, he has satisfactorily completed his period of active duty or period
10. Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 62 F. Supp. 25 (E. D. N. Y. 1945).
11. Many of the policy guides issued by Selective Service have been recently modified
or reaffirmed by consolidation in a publication entitled "Handbook-Veterans' Assistance
Program" released in September, 1945, for the benefit of reemployment committeemen
attached to local draft boards. Since this handbook constitutes the most recent official
pronouncements of Selective Service in regard to veterans' reemployment rights, and since
its publication casts doubt upon the authoritative value of many of that agency's earlier
releases, authority for Selective Service policy will be confined almost wholly in this writing
to this handbook, which is hereinafter cited as "Handbook-Veteran's Assistance Program."
12. SmEvicE ExmENsioN AcT OF 1941, 55 STAT. 627, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 357 (1941).
13. 57 STAT. 162, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1472 (1943). As to the length of time allowed
members of the Merchant Marine to apply for reinstatement to their former positions,
see note 29 infra.
14. Local Board Memorandum No. 190-A, National Headquarters, Selective Service
System, as issued May 20, 1944.
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of training and service. The form of the required certificate does not otherwise
appear to be material. A former member of the Merchant Marine in order
to be eligible for reemployment rights must have a certificate issued in accord-
ance with the rules and regulations of the Administrator of the War Shipping
Administration evidencing that he .bas completed a period of substantially
continuous service in the Merchant Marine. 15
III
"... (b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other tian a temporary
position in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such
rertificate. . .
While the absence of extensive judicial interpretation of Section 8 prevents
any finality of conclusion, it seems clear that it does not, and was never in-
tended to, apply to any person who did not terminate his employment for
the express purpose of entering the armed forces immediately or within a
reasonable time thereafter. In this connection the Director of Selective Service
has stated:
"The purpose, object, motive and primary cause in leaving the employment must
have been the entrance into active military or naval service. If the veteran had
quit his job for reasons unrelated to military service and then later entered the
armed forces, he is not entitled to the statutory rights of reemployment."'16
At least one court has dismissed a veteran's suit for damages under Section 8
because he failed to prove to the court's satisfaction that he was in the employ
of the defendant at the time of his induction. 17 In another instance a Michigan
court has held that where an employee was notified by his draft board that
he had been selected for military service and voluntarily quit his employment
to await induction five days later, he thereby severed his employment relation-
ship for all purposes arising under Section 8 and could not be considered in
the employment of defendant when he died one day before his induction.' 8
The statute does not qualify or limit the type of position protected by Sec-
tion 8 other than that it must not be "temporary." What constitutes a "position
other than temporary" is one of the indeterminables which judicial considera-
tion alone can ascettain. The issues which could arise under conflicting con-
structions of the term "temporary position" appear legion. It would be idle
to speculate upon the gamut of problems which will undoubtedly appear when
discharged veterans compete with their own replacements for the same job;
former employees seek to return to jobs which are of a seasonal or irregular
tenure; when apprentices, probationary workers, and part-time employees apply
for their old positions under post-war conditions.
15. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 301.3 (b).
16. Id. at § 301.6.
17. United States ex rel. Stanley v. Wimbish, - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945),
16 LAB. REL. REP. 804.
18. Murphy v. Chrysler Corp., 306 Mich. 610, 11 N. W. (2d) 261 (1943).
1945]
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The right of a replacement employee to reemployment in a position from
which both he and the original incumbent were inducted into the military
service appears to have been examined in only one court decision to date.
In Salzman v. London Coat of Boston, Inc.,19 plaintiff was originally hired
to replace defendant's New York sales representative, who had been inducted
intp the Army of the United States. It does not appear that plaintiff knew
when he first applied for the position that he was to replace an inductee, but
the court was satisfied that at the time he signed his contract of employment
he knew that his predecessor was on temporary leave from the company for
military service and that plaintiff was to fill the job in his absence. Plaintiff
was subsequently inducted and upon his honorable discharge and application
for reinstatement, he was refused employment in that particular capacity on
the grounds that defendant had never had more than one sales position in its
New York office and that that position had already been filled by plaintiff's
predecessor upon the latter's release from service. The court sustained the
employer, finding that its primary obligation was toward the predecessor
employee to whom the position rightfully belonged and that, as a matter
of law, plaintiff was a temporary employee not entitled to the benefits of
Section 8.
The Director of Selective Service has expanded his interpretation of a
"position other than temporary" beyond the general rule previously laid
down that, "one who is employed to fill the place made vacant by a person
entering service occupies a temporary status and has no reemployment rights
even though he subsequently enters service."' 20 Under current Selective Service
policy, more reliance appears to be placed upon the "character of the employ-
ment relationship." Whether or not a worker was part-time or probationary,
trainee, apprentice or journeyman, or whether he replaced another inductee
prior to his own induction, the temporary nature of his job should not depend
upon the particular assignment involved, but rather upon the facts and cir-
cumstances relating to the employment relationship."'2 1 Presumably, the Direc-
tor refers to the intention of the parties to the employment contract, whether
express or implied, and such a view appears to be a reasonable one. The
apparent weakness in attempting to set arbitrary standards in order to deter-
mine what is temporary and what is not, is demonstrated in a gratuitous
opinion rendered by the Solicitor of the Department of Labor on Section 8.
He has interpreted a temporary position as being one in which a person was
expressly informed when hired that he was hired as a temporary employee;
19. - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB. RE.L. REP. 149.
20. Local Board Memorandum No. 190-A, National Headquarters, Selective Service
System, as issued May 20, 1944. However, it should be noted that this general rule
was qualified to some extent by reference to the facts and circumstances of each indi-
vidual case, including that of the employment relationship.
21. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program §§ 303.2, 303.3. The Director of Selective
Service found significance in the use of the phrase "position other than temporary" by
Congress instead of "permanent," which he has construed as a more limited term.
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and even where such employee was informed of the temporary nature of his
job, he would be entitled to return to that job upon release if he had acquired
any seniority rights under the seniority system existing in the plant before
his entry into the armed forces, or if a similar position existed when he applied
for reinstatement.2 2 In other words, the actual intention of the parties would
be disregarded if it was not expressly stated at the time of hiring, and even if
it was so stipulated, presumably such intention would fall before the inexorable
sanctity of the individual's seniority rights, whether accrued over a period
of eight years or eight hours.
Of course, even if the temporary status of a particular employee seems
clear, the employer is not relieved of statutory obligations which he may owe
that employee other than those imposed by Section 8. Where a temporary
employee was found to have been discriminatorily discharged for union mem-
bership in violation of Section 8 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act2 3
and was inducted into the Army six weeks thereafter, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ordered the employer to reinstate the employee in his old position
upon his application within forty days of his release from military service.
Forty days at that time was also the period required by Section 8 of the
Selective Training and Service Act, as amended 24 within which an honorably
discharged veteran must apply for reemployment. The reinstatement ordered
by the Board was to be to his "former or a substantially equivalent position,
or . . . placement upon a preferential list . . . without prejudice to his senior-
ity or other rights and privileges." '25 The Board's decision has been sustained
by the Circuit Court of Appeals.26 Since the decision arises from an interpre-
tation of legislation other than the Selective Training and Service Act, it
naturally is not concerned with the reemployment requirements of Section 8
of that Act, including the necessity for an honorable discharge and the physical
and mental capacity of the employee to fill the job. It would therefore appear
to create an exception to the provision of Section 8 that only employees other
than temporary employees are entitled to reemployment upon discharge from
the armed forces.
IV
(2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position ......
The ability of the discharged veteran to fill his former job is necessarily a
question of fact, not amenable to any general rule. It may be expected that
22. Memorandum from Douglas B. Maggs, Solicitor of the United States Department
of Labor, to Howard T. Colvin, Acting Director of the United States Conciliation Service,
May 8, 1945.
23. 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1935).
24. 54 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 308 (1944).
25. In re Humble Oil & Refining Co., 48 N. L. R. B. 1118 (1943).
26. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 140 F. (2d) 777
(C. C. A. 5th, 1944); National Labor Relations Board v. Revlon Products Corp., 144 F.
(2d) 68 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
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an employer's claim that the employee is no longer physically or mentally
capable of filling his old job will be scrutinized with care, and in the close
case the veteran will be favored.27 His rights under Section 8 should not be
prejudiced merely because he has been medically discharged or is in a less
fit physical condition than when he departed for military service if he is still
qualified to perform the duties required by his job at that time. In Grasso v.
Charles M. Crowhurst25 it was held that where plaintiff suffered from con-
genital flat feet before he was inducted into the Army, and his condition was
not seriously aggravated by Army service, he was entitled to reinstatement
in his former position of tacker in defendant's tannery.
The Director of Selective Service has taken the view that a veteran seeking
reinstatement in his former position is not required to meet higher standards
than existed in that position at the time it was vacated by him, nor even stand-
ards which the employer may now require of other employees in the same
or similar positions. "If the position has been so changed in job content that
it is beyond the veteran's skill, he is entitled to a job requiring skill comparable
to that required by the position which he left at the time he left and equal in
seniority, status, and pay to that which he vacated."2 9 While a literal reading
of the section might not result in this same conclusion, the peculiar background
and purpose of Section 8 suggest that a reasonable construction is preferable
to a literal one. If the employer has a job available which compares favorably
-with that whcih the veteran left, its duty to reinstate him in such position
seems clear. It is doubtful, however, if even a reasonable construction of
the statute could endorse the Director's further opinion that where the veteran
could be retrained on the up-graded job to perform the new duties safely and
efficiently within a reasonable period of time, he is entitled to be employed upon
that job. 0 While a liberal construction of Section 8 in favor of the veteran
is vastly preferable to a technical-wise interpretation, a loose construction
-which exceeds the limits of reasonableness should be avoided.31
V
and (3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days
after he is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization
continuing after discharge for a period of not nore than one year .... "
27. "When a veteran seeks reemployment, there is a strong presumption that he is
qualified to perform the duties of the position he left to enter the armed forces since he
performed those duties prior to that time." Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program
§ 304.1.
28. 58 F. Supp. 857 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945).
29. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 304.2.
.30. Id. at § 304.3 (b).
31. Tipper v. Northern Pacific Ry., - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB. REL.
1REP. 147, ". . . the Act . . .must be liberally construed, but such liberal construction of
course should not be carried to the point that it does violence to the Act itself."
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The requirement that the veteran apply to his employer within the prescribed
ninety day period3 2 following his discharge or release from hospitalization is
mandatory. While no special form of application is stipulated, failure to give
notice to the employer within the required time would presumably wipe out
the veteran's reemployment rights under Section 8. It has been held by one
District Court that a mere request to the employer for an immediate leave
of absence upon the veteran's discharge from service does not constitute a
request for immediate reemployment. 33 "Such a request amounts to nothing
more than asking the employer to simultaneously reinstate the applicant and
give him an immediate vacation," the effect of which would be to permit the
applicant to extend the statutory limitation of time fixed by the Act.34 It has
therefore, been held in such a case that the veteran had not sustained the
burden of proof that he had applied for reemplQyment.
The effect of accepting interim employment upon the veteran's release from
the armed forces was considered in part in the recent case of Tipper v. Northern
Pacific Ry.35 Plaintiff was refused reinstatement by a foreman of defendant
when transferred from active to inactive duty by the Army, on the condition
that he accept employment in an essential activity in the Bremerton Navy
Yard. It was held that since such release from active duty for over-age entailed
but a change in status and was not the equivalent of a discharge, the period
of time required for application for reinstatement did not commence to run
until final discharge from the Army. Such acceptance of employment else-
where, the tenure of which exceeded a ninety day period following plaintiff's
release from active duty, did not constitute a waiver of his reemployment
rights.30 On the other hand, another court has suggested the inequitable effect
of permitting a veteran to accept other employment, when wrongfully denied
reinstatement, and then to sue to recover from his former employer the com-
pensation which he would have received if he had been reinstated, in addition
to retaining what he earned on the second job:
"Where the veteran, notwithstanding the employer's refusal to restore him to his
former position, is able to pursue his trade or profession and actually does so, it is
the opinion of this court that, while the veteran may remain within the protection
32. The original time limit of 40 days was extended to 90 days by legislative amend-
ment to the Selective Training and Service Act, effective December 8, 1944. No such
amendment has extended the period of time for application required of members of the
Merchant Marine.
33. Grasso v. Charles M. Crowhurst, 58 F. Supp. 857 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945).
34. Id. at 860.
35. - Fed. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB. RE. RE. 147.
36. The effect of this decision, if upheld, on the many officers and enlisted men who
will transfer to inactive duty in the Reserve upon their release from active service is not
clear. Unless some definite limitations are prescribed as to te time in which such em-
ployees must apply for reinstatement, this decision would suggest that the 90 day period
for such employees might be extended indefinitely. In the subject case, the veteran was
released from active service early in 1943 but was not finally discharged by the army until
March 19, 1945, at which time his 90-day application period evidently commenced to run.
1945]
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of the Act, his situation is not of the type which the Act is primarily intended to
alleviate, and compensation should be determined accordingly." 3
7
While a veteran may presumably waive his reemployment rights by failing
to make timely application for reinstatement or by voluntarily quitting the
job after reinstatement, such waiver must be proved by clear and positive
evidence, with the burden of proving its validity upon the person claiming
such waiver. 38 The Director of Selective Service has interpretated the above-
quoted subdivision to preclude a mandatory obligation of reinstatement by
the employer where the veteran voluntarily quit after being reemployed, even
though the original ninety day period had not yet elapsed on the occasion of
his second application. 3 9
VI
(B) 40 if such position was in the employ of a private employer,
such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position
of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's circumstances have
so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so;"
No portion of Section 8 has been more sharply debated than the above
paragraph. Seemingly innocuous on its face, it has been the target of a vast
amount of controversy and recrimination, misunderstanding and conflicting
opinion. Government agencies, unions, veterans' organizations, employers'
groups, and others, without benefit of judicial opinion have loosed fusilades of
dogmatic dicta concerning the interpretation of this paragraph until the picture
is muddied with confusion and uncertainty. The reason for this articulate
anxiety on the part of so many would appear to lie in the fact that economic
interests of third parties are seriously threatened under this paragraph by the
37. Kay v. General Cable Corp., 59 F. Supp. 358 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945). In the
ordinary case it is probable that the established rule of law that an employee whose
employment contract has been wrongfully terminated should minimize resultant damages by
seeking substantially equivalent employment elsewhere would prevail. Costigan v. Mohawk
& Hudson R.R. Co., 2 Denio 609 (N. Y. 1846); Howson v. Mestayer, 14 Daly 83 (N. Y.
1886) ; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 (1875) ; Johnson v. Meeker, 96 N Y. 93, 97 (1884) ;
Merrill v. Blanchard, 7 App. Div. 167, 40 N. Y. Supp. 48 (Ist Dep't 1896), aff'd without
opinion, 158 N. Y. 682, 52 N. E. 1125 (1899). The quoted dictum in the Kay case supra,
suggests that the courts may take into consideration in computing damages compensation
which a veteran, denied immediate reinstatement, earned elsewhere. Because of the
statutory right to reemployment guaranteed to qualified veterans, and the unusual economic
and social forces motivating such legislation, it is less certain that the courts will, or should,
enforce the obligation inherent in the rule of avoidable consequences in the case of a
veteran wrongfully denied reinstatement where he is not unreasonably dilatory or passive in
pressing his application upon discharge from the services.
38. Tipper v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB.
REL. REP. 147.
39. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 301.5 (b).
40. Discussion of paragraph (A) of § 8 (b), dealing with the reemployment rights of
federal employees generally is omitted.
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reappearance of the veteran at his former place of employment. Paradoxically,
while it would appear that a liberal construction of Section 8, in its entirety,
would most conform to the intent of Congress to secure the veteran's job
rights, a strictly literal construction of the above-quoted paragraph (B),
divorced from its context, is required to sustain his preferred position. It is
this conflict of liberal versus literal interpretation of the specific provisions
of paragraph (B) wherein lies the heart of the present controversy. It is
the contention of the Director of Selective Service that the mandate of Con-
gress is clear and unequivocal. The qualified veteran is to be reinstated to
"such position," meaning to his old job, without any conditions precedent
not expressed in the statute. "Such position" does not mean his old job pro-
viding he has sufficient accrued seniority to take precedence over a non-veteran.
As Selective Service stated its position in April, 1945:41
"The qualifications for reinstatement in his former position which the veteran
must fulfill are clearly specified, but 'seniority' is not one of them; it appears only
as one factor in measuring the position which may be given the veteran in lieu of
his original one .... It is clear that the veteran does not receive 'super-seniority';
he is simply not subject to seniority as a condition precedent to his restoration to
his old job. He secures restoration to his former position not because of, but
including seniority."
To sustain this stand it is essential that the phrase "such position," as used
in the Act, be intelpreted as synonymous with actual employment-"a return
to actual performance of work" as Selective Service terms it ' and not just
a rating on a seniority roster with work only when the veteran's number turns
up favorably. As was stated in the court in Kay v. General Cable Corp.:43
"The purpose and intent of Congress in framing section 8 of the Selective Train-
ing and Service Act was, I think, twofold. It was designed to provide for the
rehabilitation of the returning veteran so that he might be equipped to enter a
highly competitive world of job finding without the handicap of a long absence
from work, as well as to provide for his financial stability for the period of at least
one year following his discharge from service."'44
Under the literal interpretation of paragraph (B), the interests of fellow
employees and their collective bargaining agents are subordinated to the right
of the veteran to enjoy financial stability for the year following his military
discharge by a guarantee to him of actual work. If, upon his discharge, the
veteran finds that the only job comparable to his own is occupied by a non-
veteran, even one with greater seniority under a collective bargaining agree-
ment or company plan, the veteran is nevertheless entitled to that job. He is
entitled to his old position or, where such position no longer exists, to a posi-
tion of like seniority, status, and pay, and the Act does not make such right
41. Selective Service Publication, April, 1945; 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Service 2195;
Release S-64, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, May 9, 1945.
42. Ibid.
43. 59 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945).
44. Italics inserted.
1945]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
contingent upon conditions not enumerated therein. The consequences to third
persons should not derogate from the benefits which Congress intended to
secure to the veteran. Selective Service has summarized this proposition
succinctly:
"The only conditions for reinstatement that a veteran may be required to meet
are those conditions which are specifically enumerated in the law. Union member-
ship or other conditions not enumerated in the law may not, therefore, be required
as a prerequisite to his reinstatement." 45
The reasoning of those who deny this literal interpretation of paragraph (B)
appears to result from an endeavor to read into the phrase "shall restore such
person to such position" the qualifications attached to the alternative which
is provided for in the event the original job no longer exists. It would seem
that paragraph (B) states, in effect, that the veteran is to be restored to his
former job with no qualifications or conditions attached thereto, or, in the
alternative to a job which conforms to the seniority, status and pay of the
veteran as would have existed had his term of employment not been broken.
The alternative, being a substitute which allows an expansion of the veteran's
reemployment rights beyond the original position to which he was hired, would
appear to offer a means of permitting the employer when operating under such
alternative to abide by the mandate of the statute to give reemployment to
the veteran and at the same time respect the seniority rights of others. It fur-
ther seems only fair that any existing job which is identical to that vacated
by the veteran upon his induction should be presumed to be his original job
upon reinstatement.
The irreconcilable conflict which the literal interpretation of paragraph (B)
encounters with the so-called "seniority roster" line of reasoning is manifest.
Prior to the first judicial decision in August, 1945, dealing with seniority as
a condition of employment,46 the field of discussion was strewn with dicta and
governmental pronouncements of varying degrees of usefulness. In May, 1945,
the Solicitor of the Department of Labor released a statement construing
Section 8 as making the veteran's right to reemployment and subsequent up-
grading and promotion, (as well as demotion and lay-off) absolutely conditional
upon his relative place on the seniority list.47 The right of a veteran to replace
a non-veteran who possesses greater seniority and occupies the former's old
job has been specifically denied in an arbitration of a labor dispute involving
this issue.48 The former Attorney-General of the United States made it clear
45. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 305.3.
46. Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Corp., 62 F. Supp. 25 (E. D. N. Y. 1945).
47. Memorandum from Douglas B. Maggs, Solicitor of the United States Department
of Labor, to Howard T. Colvin, Acting Director of the United States Conciliation Service,
May 8, 1945.
48. In re Timken Roller Bearing Co. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 1123
(C.I.O.), - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 16 LAn. REL,. REP. 158. The same company
has recently requested a declaratory judgment from the District Court for Northern Ohio
to determine its responsibility in reinstating a veteran to his former job regardless of
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that the Department of Justice would represent veterans claiming reemploy-
ment regardless of seniority rights, but that
"since the 'superseniority' interpretation is not free from doubt under the Act, the
Department will expect to present the issue to the Courts with full candor. Any
briefs submitted will disclose the consideration and the legislative history both pro
and con. . . .Any veteran seeking representation in asserting a superseniority claim
should be informed of the fact that his case will be presented in this manner, so
that he can retain private counsel should he prefer to do so."49
The first judicial interpretation of the seniority issue was rendered in
August, 1945, in Fiskgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Corp.Y° Plaintiff,
a first-class welder, was reinstated by defendant to his permanent job upon
release from the armed forces but was immediately laid off for nine days while
non-veteran employees of the same status and pay, but with greater seniority,
remained on the job. Refusing to find that such a lay-off was not tantamount
to a discharge under Section 8, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to
recover his regular compensation for those days during which he was not
permitted to work. In finding in favor of the veteran, Judge Abruzzo
of the federal court stated in part:
"I am convinced that Congress had in mind that a returning veteran should have
the opportunity of having one year to avoid open competition, due to the fact that
for two, three or four years he was away.
"I am not going into the equity of the situation; I am not concerned with whom
he has to displace. . . .There is no issue here as to the collective bargaining act,
but in passing I might state that the collective bargaining act before me conforms
exactly, as far as I can see, to the language of the Selective Service Act.
"I believe that Congress intended that during the period of one year, any day
that there was work, between veterans and non-veterans the veteran was entitled
to the preference and he was not to work .only if the defendant had no work or
had to choose between World War veterans of World War II."51
The reading into the statute of the rights which veterans of World War II
may have over other veterans of World War II is a significant addition to
seniority rights provided for in its union contract. - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945),
17 LAB. REL. REP.. 183. A more recent arbitration decision held that a non-veteran with
greater seniority had preference over a veteran in choice of shifts and that the Selective
Training and Service Act did not guarantee such "incidents" to the veterans' job as
the right to work on the particular shift which he left upon induction. In re Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. and United Rubber Workers of America, Local 100 (C.I.O.),
- F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash. 1945), 17 LAB. REL. REP. 77. This same issue has been
raised recently in a suit fled by a veteran to recover pay for time allegedly lost during
a two-weeks' period following his honorable discharge and application for reinstatement
when the company offered him a job identical with his old one, paying the same rate of
compensation but on a shift other than the shift on which he was working when inducted.
Grubbs v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., - F. Supp. - (W. D. Ala. 1945), 17 LAB. REL. REP. 280.
49. Department of Justice Circular No 3851, Supplement No 3, May 10, 1945.
50. 62 F. Supp. 25 (E. D. N. Y. 1945).
51. Id. at 26.
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the liberal construction of the statute. It suggests an inconsistent, although
equitable, digression from the strict interpretation of paragraph (B). Signifi-
cant as the Fishgold decision may be, the ultimate disposition of the issue
of seniority rights under paragraph (B), as well as its less frictional compo-
nents of like "Status and pay," must be yet determined by the appellate courts.
Despite the assertions of those who would find implied conditions precedent to
reemployment in paragraph (B) the only apparent condition lies in the text of
the provision itself: "... . unless the employer's circumstances have so changed
as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so."
The constitutionality of this latter provision was challenged in one of the
first court tests in which Section 8 was involved. In Hall v. Union Light, Heat
& Power Co. 5 2 plaintiff sought to recover back pay for the three months fol-
lowing his honorable discharge during which he was denied reemployment by
defendant. Defendant employer admitted the facts substantially as charged
but based its defense in part on the claim that paragraph (B) was repugnant
to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution guaranteeing due
process of law and that persons accused of crime shall be adequately informed
of the nature of the accusation; that the terms "impossible" and "unreason-
able" were so vague and uncertain that the section could not reasonably be
complied with; that what constitutes a violation, whether wilful or inadvertent,
is not specifically defined and therefore must be determined by the courts.
Citing the familiar rule that every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of a statute and that it should not be held invalid
unless its violation of the Constitution is clear, complete, and unmistakable, 3
the court determined that the terms "impossible" and "unreasonable" were
not so vague and obscure as to leave an employer in doubt as to his obligations
under the statute. Pointing to the effect which such a piece of legislation has
upon the morale of the military forces in a time of grave emergency, the court
declared that it would be an unwarranted usurpation of the legislative function
of providing for the common defense to strike it down because it necessarily
employs terms of a more or less indefinite and negative meaning, especially
where the statute in question is not a criminal statute.54 In this latter respect
the court distinguished United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.55 in which the
United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute employing the
terms "unjust and unreasonable" in the setting of rates on the ground that
it involved a criminal prosecution. In disposing of the holding in the Cohen
52. 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
53. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87 (U. S. 1810); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502
(1934).
54. Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817, 819 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
The court cited with approval United States v. Ragen, 313 U. S. 512, 524 (1942), in
which it was said: "On no construction can the statutory provision here involved become
a trap for those who act in good faith. A mind intent upon wilful evasion is inconsistent
with surprised innocence."
55. 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
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decision the court in the present case50 emphasized that there is a vast differ-
ence between a person answering an indictment which makes the general charge
that he has been guilty of an unjust and unreasonable act, and a civil action
in which the question for determination is merely whether or not an employer
has had such a change in his or its circumstances as to make it impossible or
unreasonable to reemploy a veteran.5 7
Mere inconvenience to an employer, or undesirability of a returning veteran
as an employee, does not constitute such a change of the employer's circum-
stances as to make the veteran's reinstatement "impossible or unreasonable."
In Kay v. General Cable Corp.,58 plaintiff was a physician who, prior to his
entry into the armed forces, was regularly employed as a medical director
by defendant and was denied reinstatement upon his release from military
service. Plaintiff, in addition to his former duties as company physician, had
also been engaged as physician for an employees' Health Association in de-
fendant's plant to give medical treatment for ills not connected with com-
pensable injuries, which were covered by his regular duties as medical director
to defendant. The employees' Health Association having refused to reengage
plaintiff in preference to the person who had replaced him, defendant employer
contended that it would permit greater efficiency and also avoid loss of the
workers' time if the same physician were engaged by the company and the
Health Association. Reinstatement of plaintiff would presumably necessitate
retention of another physician for the Health Association. Denying that such
a set of facts constituted a change that would make it unreasonable for defend-
ant to reinstate plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a judgment
of the District Court dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for
appropriate action, with the observation:
"Accepting the defendant's contention that there would be some loss of efficiency
and possibly some additional expense involved, more than that is needed to justify
refusal to reinstate a person within the protection of the Act. In most cases it is
possible to give some reason for the refusal. 'Unreasonable' means more than in-
convenient or undesirable. . . .The Act intends that the employee should be re-
stored to his position even though he has been temporarily replaced by a substitute
who has been able, either by greater efficiency or a more acceptable personality,
to make it desirable for the employer to make the change a permanent one." 59
The court in the Kay case specifically declined to consider whether the
reinstatement of a veteran would so materially affect his relations with fellow
employees or other third parties as to constitute a change in the employer's
circumstances within the meaning of Section 8. The Director of Selective
Service has declared that the proviso "unless the employer's circumstances have
so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so" applies only
to the employer. The consequences to third parties not being provided for,
56. Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
57. Id. at 820.
58. 144 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944), rev'g, 59 F. Supp. 358 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945).
59. Id. at 655.
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the "impossible and unreasonable" provision should not be applied to cover
the effect of the veteran's restoration on third persons, such as other
employees."
The opinion of the Director of Selective Service would appear to conform
to the purposes of the Act. Too frequently the point is overlooked that Section 8
of the Selective Training and Service Act was enacted to benefit veterans only,
and not fellow-employees, labor unions, or management. Its salutary provi-
sions should be confined to the benefit of veterans. If further legislation is
desired to benefit non-veterans and their collective bargaining agents, the par-
liamentary facilities are available. It is certain that the effectiveness of Sec-
tion 8 should not be destroyed by reading into it the demands of persons and
organizations not covered by the Act.
VII
"(c) if such position was in the employ of any State or political sub-
division thereof, it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress
that such person should be restored to such position or to a position of
like seniority, status, and pay."
The language of the subdivision clearly distinguishes this paragraph from
the two preceding paragraphs. It is only the sense of Congress that the states
conform to the requirements of reemployment laid down for private employers
and the federal government. Congress has not attempted to lay mandatory
restrictions upon a purely administrative function of the states in their relation-
ship with their own employees, and whether or not a state chooses to conform
to the provisions of Section 8 appears to rest within the state's discretion."'
It is not extravagant to suggest that a more positive directive to the states with
respect to their own employees might have encountered a strenuous objection
that the Constitutional provision guaranteeing the reserved powers of the
states was being violated.62
60. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 305.2. However, the Director would
allow priority to other veterans of World War II who, before leaving for entry in the
armed forces, occupied the same job assignment prior to the time at which the veteran
Already restored had been placed in it. § 306.3 (c).
61. For a state court decision so construing the Act, see McLaughlin v. Retherford,
184 S. W. (2d) 461 (1944).
62. "The States, resting upon their original basis of sovereignty, subject only to the
exceptions stated, exercise their powers over everything connected with their social and
internal condition. A State regulates its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of
estates, real and personal, and acts upon all internal matters which relate to its moral
and political welfare. Over these subjects the federal government has no power." Thurlow
v. Commonwealth, 5 How. 504, 588 (U. S. 1847). See also, 1 WiLLoUGuBy, Coxsrn=-
TIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1929) § 131.
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VIII
"(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered
as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of train-
ing and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored without
loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other
benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices
relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the
employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall
not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after
such restoration."
The provisions of this subsection have not been examined at length by the
courts, although it must be anticipated that disputes as to certain of its terms
cannot be avoided. The veteran is considered on furlough or leave of absence
from his employment during his military service, a fact which suggests that
his tenure of employment has never been terminated; rather his active per-
formance on the job has been suspended until such time as he is qualified to
apply, and does so, for reinstatement to active employment. Thus, the term
"reemployment" would not seem technically correct since it connotes re-hiring.
This interpretation of the employee's status while in the armed forces has been
sustained in a decision rendered by the New York Surrogate's Court in In re
Walker's Estate.63 Testatrix had provided for bequests to all persons who
should be in her employ at the time of her death. An employee of the testatrix
was inducted into the armed forces, and subsequently- died in action following
testatrix's death. The court held that the employee's administrator was en-
titled to recover his share under the will on the grounds that upon his induc-
tion he continued in testatrix's employment although on furlough under Sec-
tion 8 (c) of the Act.
The term "shall be restored without loss of seniority" has been interpreted
by the Director of Selective Service as an accumulation of seniority rights dur-
ing his period of active military service. The veteran is entitled to have added
to his length of service with the employer the total time spent in military
service and to receive any additional benefits or advantages-to which the total
length of service, including the time spent in .miitary service, entitles him.64
Such an interpretation of subsection (c) appears to be the most equitable to
the veteran in competing with those who remained behind, although it dis-
regards the possibility that his seniority might have been terminated by a
discharge or resignation had he not been inducted into the armed services.
Participation in insurance and other benefits offered by the employer which
presumably do not accrue solely by length of service must depend upon the
established rules and practices of the employer relating to employees on leave
of absence or furlough at the time of entry into the armed forces. However,
63. - Misc. -, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 106 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
64. Handbook-Veterans' Assistance Program § 306.7.
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Selective Service has suggested that a reinstated veteran is entitled as a matter
of right to any wage increases accruing within his rate range during his absence
and based solely upon length of service.65 Similarly, General Counsel to the
National War Labor Board in November, 1944, issued an opinion that where
a company had an automatic wage progression plan based on length of service,
a returning veteran should be reemployed at the level in the schedule at which
he would have been entitled if there had been no break in his service with
the company. Such veteran is therefore deemed to be entitled to any length
of service increases which the job would have carried with it during his military
service, exclusive of course, of promotions from one job or grade to another
and bona fide apprentice or trainee progressions which are governed by con-
siderations of skill and ability as well as length of service.
66
While such a construction favors the returning veteran by placing him at
the top of his rate range if he has served the time required to progress to
such maximum, its application appears to defeat the common expectation under
an automatic wage progression plan that increased productivity will accompany
increased skill and ability resulting from length of performance on the job. It
may also be anticipated that the rate ranges for job classifications filled by re-
turning veterans will be unduly top-heavy under this construction, since in most
cases those employees must be placed at the maximum of their range upon re-
instatement. The result of such a situation might be mitigated where a com-
pany's employees in the armed forces do not form an unduly large proportion of
the company's post-war personnel. Participation in benefits accruing from vaca-
tion and holiday plans, sick leave, if any, and insurance benefits would appear to
be determined by the employer's customs or agreement relating to employees
on furlough or leave of absence in effect at the time of induction.617
What constitutes "cause" justifying a reemployed veteran's discharge within
one year after his actual restoration to his former job is necessarily a question
of fact which in many instances must depend upon the individual case. The
act should not be construed to permit discharge for refusal of the veteran to
65. Id. at § 306.9.
66. National War Labor Board Releases- B-1834, issued November 16, 1944, and
B-1834-a, issued December 10, 1944. While it should be remembered that such an opinion
is confined to the Board's jurisdiction as determined by law, the foregoing rule was sub-
sequently directed by the Board to be applied in a disputed case involving this issue. In re
Marmon-Harrington Company and United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, Local No. 226 (C.I.O.), Case No. 111-6558-D, January 30,
1945, N. W. L. B. Release B-1834-b.
67. In Murphy v. Chrysler Corp., 306 Mich. 610, 11 N. W. (2d) 261 (1943), it was
held that the personal representatives of an employee who had voluntarily quit live days
before his scheduled induction and died one day prior thereto were not entitled to recover
the proceeds of a life insurance policy maintained by the decedent under a group insurance
plan during his employment. Since he was deemed to have severed his employment relation-
ship in the day he last clocked out, he was not on a mere leave of absence or furlough
under § 8 (c) even though he quit for the express purpose of awaiting imminent induction,
c -d therefore his insurance policy, which was conditional upon continuous employment,
ex,,'zcd at the date of separation.
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join a union where the company has agreed to a closed or union shop during
his absence, nor does it seem clear that he should be required to join as a
condition of reemployment even where a dosed or union shop existed in the
employer's plant at the time of the veteran's induction. Since union member-
ship is not stipulated as a condition precedent to reinstatement, it would be
unjust and illogical to require the veteran to be discharged subsequent to
reinstatement within the one-year period for failure to abide by a condition of
union membership, especially where Congress did not express any intention
to create such a condition. To the contention that a dosed or union shop exist-
ing at the time of the employee's induction was included in his employment
contract and therefore constitutes a part of "such position" to which he must
return, it should be pointed out that if applied consistently such a proposition
would subordinate the reemployment rights of the veteran to the seniority plan
which formed a part of the contractual relationship upon his induction. Such
a condition, as already noted, cannot be justified. On the other hand it may
be contended that reading into the reemployment provisions .a condition
such as seniority would completely. frustrate the evident intent of Congress
to assure the veteran actual work; whereas no such result would necessarily
follow from the implication of other conditions of reemployment, such as
union membership, to which the veteran was actually subject at the time he
entered the military service. Retention of his job is 4s important to the vet-
eran's adjustment in a post war economy as his reinstatement, and neither right
should be undermined by unwritten qualifications. Discharge for cause should
be interpreted in the sense that it is commonly understood by the worker and
his employer-as a proper disciplinary or remedial prerogative of management
for an infraction of its rules or inability of the employee to perform his job.68
However, where a veteran, prior to his entry into the armed forces, signed an
agreement with his employer providing that the employment relationship
could be cancelled by either party upon six months' notice, its termination by
the employer while the employee was still in service was held valid.69
Ix
"(e) In case any private employer fails or refuses to comply with the
provisions of subsection (b) or subsection (c), the district court of the
United States for the district in which such private employer maintains a
place of business shall have power, upon the filing of a motion, petition,
or other appropriate pleading by the person entitled to the benefits of
such provisions, to specifically require such employer to comply with such
68. In Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 62 F. Supp. 25 (E. D. N. Y. 1945),
the court construed a lay-off for lack of work as the equivalent of a discharge without
cause.
69. Wright v. Weaver Bros. Inc., 56 F. Supp. 595 (D. C., D. Md. 1944). The case
was decided under the Army Reserve and Retired Personnel Law of 1940, 54 STAT. 858,
50 U. S. C. A. 403, the reemployment provisions of which are identical to those of the
Selective Training and Service Act.
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provisions, and, as an incident thereto, to compensate such person for any
loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of such employer's unlawful
action. The court shall order a speedy hearing in any such case and shall
advance it on the calendar. Upon application to the United States dis-
trict attorney or comparable official for the district in which such private
employer maintains a place of business, by any person claiming to be
entitled to the benefits of such provisions, such United States district
attorney or official, if reasonably satisfied that the person so applying is
entitled to such benefits, shall appear and act as attorney for suck person
in the amicable adjustment of the claim or in the filing of any motion,
petition, or other appropriate pleading and the prosecution thereof to
specifically require such employer to comply with such provisions; Pro-
vided, That no fees or court costs shall be taxed against the person so
applying for such benefits."
The procedural requirements of Section 8 have undergone a somewhat closer
examination by the courts than have some of its other provisions. The United
States district attorney for the district in which the employer maintains his
place of business is vested with the duty of serving as counsel for the veteran
in any case in which the applicant appears to be covered by Section 8 and
seeks his assistance. The responsibility of the United States Attorney in
initially deciding whether the applicant is so covered should not be under-
taken lightly, since his judgment is incidental to the court's function of finally
determining the applicant's coverage and rights appertaining thereto. It there-
fore might seem regrettable that the former United States Attorney General
saw fit to publicize the fact that the duty of United States district attorneys
generally was "not only to represent the veteran, as provided by statute, but
acting as an officer of the court, to present to the court whatever may be
useful in helping the court arrive at a proper construction of the statute."70
Whether or not this directive be modified by the present Attorney General,
the impression remains that the counsel whom Congress has designated to
represent the veteran might maintain such impartiality as to defeat the legis-
lative purpose in providing the veteran-particularly the needy veteran-with
adequate legal representation. No uncertainty of counsel's ultimate duty
should confront the veteran who seeks his assistance.
Where it appears that the employer contemplates violating the reemploy-
ment rights of an employee not yet released from military service, it has been
held that an action by such employee for a declaratory judgment confirming
his right to reemployment upon his honorable discharge, if otherwise qualified,
was not "premature."'
One of the defenses raised in Hall v. Union Light, Heat and Power Com-
pany72 was that the court lacked jurisdiction in that the action was one merely
70. Dept. of Justice Circular No. 3851, Supplement No. 3, May 10, 1945.
71. See note 69, supra.
72. 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
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to recover back pay for a period during which the company wrongfully had
refused to reinstate plaintiff. It was argued that since subsection (e) provides
for the proper district court "to specifically require such employer to comply
with such provisions, and, as an incident thereto, to compensate such person
for any loss of wages suffered . . .", a suit merely to recover back wages after
reinstatement could not be properly brought. The court declined to accept a
narrow construction of the word "incident" as implying a relationship to some
superior thing--i.e., an action to recover the actual position or employment.
A denial of the veteran's right to prosecute, based on such a technicality,
would be to place in the hands of a dilatory employer the means through which
it could defeat the whole purpose of the Act and to make a mockery of what
the Congress had in mind in its passage. The court observed that to confine
the right to recover wages only to the cases in which the veteran is required
to go into court to recover his job is making a distinction without a difference.73
The court in the Hall case, in denying a motion to dismiss the complaint,
found no objection to allowing recovery of back wages from the date of
application for reemployment. A contrary ruling appears in Kay v. General
Cable Corp.74 in a decision of the District Court after its previous judgment
dismissing the complaint had been reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
and remanded for appropriate action.75 The original complaint had been filed
some six months after plaintiff was denied reinstatement by defendant. In
accordance with the mandate of the Circuit Court, an ex parte order was
entered providing for plaintiff's reinstatement and further ordering defendant
to compensate him at his regular rate of pay for the period from the date of
application to the date of restoration to plaintiff's former position. Defendant
moved to vacate this order and asked for entry of an order directing it to pay
plaintiff only for the loss of one year's wages. The previous order was vacated
and the defendant directed to pay plaintiff only for the period since the insti-
tution of the original actionY6 Basis for the court's finding appears to lie in
the fact that the veteran waited six months after he was refused reinstatement
before commencing an action under Section 8. The provisions of that section
give him immediate relief in the proper district court upon his employer's
refusal to reemploy him, and a delay of six months following such refusal was
held to bar recourse against the employer for compensation during such ex-
tended period.77
While such a rule doubtless encourages an expeditious filing of complaints
73. Id. at 818.
74. 59 F. Supp. 358 (D. C., D. N. J. 1945).
75. Kay v. General Cable Corp., 144 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
76. The court further held that plaintiff was entitled to such compensation until the
time when the District Court rendered its .opinion adverse to him and favorable to the
employer. For the period during which the decision favorable to the employer remained
outstanding and unreversed, no compensation need be paid. For the date of the Circuit
Court opinion reversing the decision of the District Court until plaintiff was restored to
his position, the regular rate of compensation was to be resumed.
77. Kay v. General Cable Corp., 59 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. C., D. N. 3. 1945).
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by veterans denied reinstatement, it appears to permit abuse by an unscrupu-
lous employer who might desire to postpone reinstatement by prolonging nego-
tiations with the former employee and lulling him with false promises. It is
submitted that a more reasonable rule might be to permit recovery of back
wages from the date of application unless the employee is unable to offer
a satisfactory reason for delaying commencement of the suit beyond a reason-
able time after such application. If his reason does not satisfy the court, then
the date from which compensation should be paid would be the date of
commencement of the action.
One further step in interpreting Section 8 (e) was made in Salzman v.
London Coat of Boston, Inc.,78 in which it was held that where the unsuccessful
plaintiff had not availed himself of the provisions of subsection (e) by filing
his suit through the office of the United States Attorney, he was not entitled
to the benefit of the provision that "no fees or court costs shall be taxed against
the person so applying for such benefits."
X
Much remains to be done by the courts in establishing the meaning and
proper application of Section 8. Despite the generally well-reasoned guides
issued by the Director of Selective Service to his field representatives, and the
gratuitous opinions, observations, and communiques released by various gov-
ernment agencies, labor unions, employer's associations, and others, the ulti-
mate interpretation must rest with the judiciary. The proposals for so-called
clarifying legislation do not seem to be well-founded. The language of Section 8,
while it must necessarily be broad in order to cover a variety of situations, is
reasonably clear in its purpose to assure employment to the qualified veteran.
Its provisions should not be misapplied in order to assure employment for
non-veterans who may be displaced as a result of the veteran's reinstatement.
If additional legislation is required to assist displaced workers in obtaining
employment, it should be enacted as a supplement to, and not at the expense
of, the reemployment provisions of Section 8. As veterans reemployment
legislation, Section 8, as it now reads, appears to be workable, if properly
applied.
78. - F. Supp. - (W. D. Wash 1945), 17 LAB. REL. REP. 149.
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